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A Struggle for Continuity at a Time of Change 
COLETTE HARRIS 
Abstract 
This paper addresses coping strategies used by men in Kaduna to ward off chaos 
resulting from economic instability, situating them within the global context and 
national policies on gender and religion. They include upholding a set of gender 
norms in which adult masculinity’s most crucial traits are control over women and 
children, and breadwinning. These norms were introduced into Nigeria under 
colonialism and through Islam and Christianity, yet today they are considered to 
represent local traditions. Religion is also important for coping strategies, 
especially the newer Pentecostal churches and reformist mosques, characterized 
by emphasis on literalist interpretations of the scriptures and notions of male 
superiority. Poor men have particularly welcomed the levels of certainty, moral 
and material support they provide as well as the legitimization of their gender 
power positions, especially those struggling to perform appropriate masculinity, 
while at the same time these establishments have facilitated sectarian violence. 
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Introduction1 
This paper addresses the issue of how men in Kaduna in northern Nigeria 
have been affected by global processes of change, and their coping 
strategies. In so doing it looks at the interconnections between colonialism, 
religion, globalizing capitalism, and the Nigerian state in relation to the 
performance of masculinities among the male inhabitants of the city.  
The importance placed on gender by the aforementioned 
institutions can be seen by the attention they pay to it. Feminist scholars 
have shown how crucial gender, particularly masculinity, is to all aspects of 
politics, despite its largely being ignored by mainstream political scientists.2 
R.W. Connell has further posited the notion that we are all embedded in a 
‘global gender order’ that links the local and the transnational in multiple, 
often contradictory and always complex, ways to globalizing capitalism at 
the centre.3  
The word ‘order’ is crucial here, implying as it does the opposite of 
chaos, and Connell suggests that gender bears similar connotations in that 
it too is intimately related to attempts to organize society. According to 
Shmuel Eisenstadt, religion lends itself to the same purposes,4 making it a 
                                                     
1  I wish to thank the editors of this special issue, the journal editors, the anonymous 
reviewer, and also Ben Jones, Lee Marsden, and Paolo Possiedi for their comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. I extend a particular thanks to Robert Morrell for his most 
useful remarks on the masculinities sections. 
2  Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarism, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld 2007; 
Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Cognitive Short Cuts’ in Jane Parpart and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), 
Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations, 
London: Zed 2008, 23-46. Colette Harris, ‘State Business: Gender, Sex and Marriage in 
Tajikistan’ in Central Asian Survey, 30:1 (2011), 97-111. 
3  R.W. Connell, ‘Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities’ in Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff 
Hearn, and R.W. Connell (eds.), Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 2005, 71-89. 
4  Shmuel Eisenstadt, ‘The Construction of Collective Identities and the Continual 
Reconstruction of Primordiality’ in Sinisa Maleseviç and Mark Haugaard (eds.), Making 
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useful bedfellow for gender, as we shall see. Moreover, religion and gender 
are symbiotically linked through normative notions of social practices. 
This paper explores how these two institutions are deployed by 
men reacting to the crumbling of the social order under economic stresses 
as they seek to find their feet in the face of change. I argue that they use 
religion and particularly membership of newer churches and mosques to 
support them in making sense of the unstable situations in which they live, 
as well as in preserving their masculine power position within the family, 
while some of these religious institutions also facilitate participation in the 
sectarian violence that has come to dominate the scene in Kaduna today. 
Meanwhile, all of this is sustained by the position of the Nigerian state, 
embedded as it is in the (neoliberally organized) global political economy. 
Methodology 
The data this paper is based on were collected between 2007 and 2011 in 
the course of a series of research projects under the auspices respectively 
of the Citizenship Development Research Centre funded by the UK’s 
Department for International Development and the British Research 
Councils’ Religion and Society Programme.5 The main fieldwork methods 
were participant observation and group discussions. Most of the latter 
occurred in connection with community-based education projects rather 
than the more common focus groups, although the two have a lot in 
common, both being centred round specific, pre-selected topics. One 
major difference is that in focus groups it is the facilitator/researcher who 
selects the topics, while in these education projects it was the participants 
who did so, based on their identification of the problems facing them. Here 
also the long-term relationships among group members as well as between 
them and the facilitators, tended to create high levels of trust, which 
positively influenced the opinions group members felt able to express. 
Thirdly, the discussions took place in multiple small groups of five or six 
persons each, the role of the facilitators being to move among the groups, 
asking pertinent questions to encourage sharper thinking at appropriate 
moments.6 These practices were based on the application of discovery-
                                                                                                                                       
Sense of Collectivity: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Globalisation, London: Pluto 2002, 33-
87. 
5  For more information on the Religion and Society projects see the website 
www.uea.ac.uk/dev/kaduna. 
6  For more detailed explanations of these processes see, Colette Harris, ‘Transformative 
Education in Violent Contexts: Working with Muslim and Christian Youth in Kaduna, 
Nigeria’ in IDS Bulletin, Researching Violence 40:3 (2009), 34-40; Colette Harris 
‘Deconstructing Masculinities in Kaduna, Nigeria’, in Alp Biricik and Jeff Hearn (eds.), 
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based pedagogies that supported participants to reveal the underlying 
issues, make their own analyses and apply their own solutions.7  
My role in the education projects was to train local facilitators and 
participate in a few of the sessions; most of these, however, were carried 
out in my absence by the facilitators, who also made notes on the 
discussions. These notes and the ones I took myself form an important part 
of the data, all this of course subject to the same level of ethical scrutiny as 
in any other research project. In relation to the validity of data collected by 
this means, as always when using group discussions for research purposes, 
it is important to take inter-personal dynamics and the influences 
participants exert on one another into consideration, as well as the 
positionality of the facilitators. However, the fact that here the discussions 
took place mainly within small groups, to which the facilitators were largely 
peripheral, should have diminished the influence of facilitators/researchers 
over what was said. 
The participants in the Kaduna projects consisted of women’s and 
youth groups from different parts of the city, involving Muslims and 
Christians from a variety of denominations and ethnicities. The vast 
majority of participating youths were male but a handful of unmarried 
young women also joined in. While the women’s groups embraced 
members of both religions, at the start Christian and Muslim youth groups 
worked separately; it was only later they started to collaborate. 
Trajectory of the Paper 
The paper starts by outlining my conceptual framework before going on to 
discuss how the main notions from it relate to the Nigerian context. Next, I 
describe the attitudes of both state and religious institutions in the wake of 
the establishment of new denominations that speak to the needs of 
contemporary society. I end by describing the situation in Kaduna, 
                                                                                                                                       
Proceedings from GEXcel Theme 9: Gendered Sexualed Transnationalisations, 
Deconstructing the Dominant: Transforming men, ‘centres’ and 
knowledge/policy/practice Spring 2011, GEXcel Work in Progress Report XV (2011), 241-
252, accessed 1 August 2012, http://www.genderexcel.org/?q=webfm_send/84. See 
also, Colette Harris, ‘Working with Young Christian and Muslim Men on Community-
Based Pedagogies for Violence Reduction and Social Change in Kaduna, Nigeria’ in Linda 
Woodhead (ed.), How to Research Religion: Putting Methods Into Practice, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press forthcoming 2013. 
7  Following Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York: Continuum 
International, Myra Bergman Ramos (trans.), (30th Anniversary Edition) 2005. See also 
Colette Harris, Pedagogy for Development: Some Reflections on Method, IDS Working 
Paper (2007), 289. 
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analysing how some of its poorer male inhabitants make use of religion to 
help them cope with today’s difficult and unstable economic situation, and 
the relationship with masculinities and violence.  
The Meaning of Gender 
Gender is simultaneously an effect of psychological development from 
infancy8 and a set of social practices, differing among cultural groupings 
but in today’s world also affected by national and global influences. At the 
individual level it thus exists on both immanent and transcendental planes, 
meaning not all aspects are accessible to the consciousness and so 
available to be deliberately changed. Viewed from the sociopolitical level, 
gender is about hierarchical power relations imposed through locally 
applied sets of norms on differentially sexed bodies. Such norms fast 
become institutionalized and sedimented into tradition, to the point that 
certain elements within them come to look essential to human survival and 
appear eternal, the memory of even recent introduction lost.9 
To become intelligible, gender must be expressed through ‘actions, 
gestures, speech’ aimed at ‘produc[ing] the effect of some true or abiding 
feminine [or masculine] essence or disposition’ – that is, it must be 
performed. Individual performances are constrained by pressures to 
conform to the expectations of one’s social group, resulting in the 
production and reproduction of regulatory relations of power.10 
Masculinity and femininity are interdependent, the former’s superior 
positionality rendering it particularly vulnerable since its appropriate 
performance depends on the complementary performance of femininity. 
This helps explain the intense efforts often exerted on women to force 
their compliance and means that masculinity can best be studied in 
relationship with femininity.11 
Although masculinity is concerned with the normative expectations 
placed upon males it is not simply an attribute of men, just as femininity is 
not of women. However, anxieties are always linked to any tendency to 
                                                     
8  Kaja Silverman, Male Subjectivity at the Margins, New York: Routledge 1992. 
9  Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York: 
Routledge 1999, second edition; Judith Butler, Undoing Gender, London: Routledge 
2004; Connell, Masculinities; Colette Harris, Control and Subversion: Gender Relations in 
Tajikistan, London: Pluto Press 2004, 15. 
10  Judith Butler, ‘Melancholy Gender/Refused Identification’, in Maurice Berger, Brian 
Wallis, Simon Watson and Carrie Mae Weems (eds.), Constructing Masculinity, London: 
Routledge 1995, 21-36: 31-32. Butler, Gender Trouble.  
11  Harris, Control and Subversion. 
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swap these around, since it appears as a threat to the gender order. This is 
particularly evident in the case of men suspected of adopting behaviour 
considered feminine, most obviously in the case of male homosexuality, 
seen as coterminous with relinquishing the active and hence superior 
power of masculinity.12 
Nevertheless, nobody ever completely succeeds in conforming to 
the norms; the ways in which performances deviate depend on the 
individuals concerned and vary over time, as indeed do the norms 
themselves, even if most variations in the latter are too small to be 
immediately apparent. The extent to which individuals get away with 
deviance unpunished depends on its nature, as well as on the social capital 
of those concerned.13  
Since gender is culturally dependent, it is influenced by modalities 
such as religion and ethnicity, in multicultural settings producing the co-
existence of different sets of norms that influence each other to a greater 
or lesser degree. However, it also differs among social groups within each 
culture, depending on class, education level and other modalities and is 
further influenced by material circumstances.14 Moreover, some men 
appear to have achieved a more dominant or hegemonic version of 
masculinity, one that demonstrates a superior level of performance and 
hereby creates a role model others may aspire to but that especially for the 
poorest and least educated men is unlikely ever to be realizable.15  
Gender in Nigeria 
The gender structure described above applies to cultural settings 
privileging power relations based around the biological distinction between 
sexed bodies.16 In this respect, at least for the Igbo and Yoruba peoples 
who form the majority ethnicities in southern Nigeria, it has been claimed 
that historically gender was not a meaningful category, since in both cases, 
albeit in somewhat different ways, power relations were structured around 
                                                     
12  Connell, Masculinities. 
13  Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter, on the Discursive Limits of "Sex", London: Routledge 
1993; Butler, Undoing Gender; Harris, Control and Subversion. 
14  Cf. Connell, Masculinities; Robert Morrell, ‘The Times of Change: Men and Masculinity 
in South Africa’ in Robert Morrell (ed.) Changing Men in Southern Africa, London: Zed, 
3-37. 
15  Connell, Masculinities. 
16  Ibid. 
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seniority not sex.17 Claims that age was of greater import than sex for 
power relations among the pre-Muslim Hausa, the main ethnic group in 
northern Nigeria, have also been made.18 In all three cases, it was the dual 
contact with the colonial state and with patriarchal religion in the form of 
Islam or Christianity that destabilized cultural norms, allowing men to 
assume new levels of dominance.  
While the Hausa took over the ideal of female seclusion from their 
Fulani rulers along with conversion to Islam,19 those converting to 
Christianity were also confronted with notions of male superiority and 
learned that women’s role was to act as helpmeets to their husbands. 
Mission schools prepared boys for entry to the civil service, girls for futures 
as wives and mothers.20 Over the course of the twentieth century, almost 
all the inhabitants of Nigeria converted to one or other of these two 
religions,21 thereby encouraging the development of gender power 
relations nationally.  
Gender is of course not merely a black box of unequal power 
relations. The performances expected of men and women encompass both 
self-presentation22 and the specific roles seen as appropriate for one’s 
particular sexed body and sociocultural group. The colonial state added a 
new dimension – the concept of men as wage-earners. Although women 
continued to carry out productive work, the ideal of the domesticated 
female became important in struggles over men’s wages and was 
                                                     
17  Ifi Amadiume, Re-Inventing Africa: Matriarchy, Religion and Culture, London: Zed Books 
1997; Nkiru Uwechia Nzegwu, ‘Review: Chasing Shadows: The Misplaced Search for 
Matriarchy’ in Canadian Journal of African Studies 32:3 (1998), 594-622; Oyèrónké 
Oyěwùmí, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender 
Discourses, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1997. 
18  Murray Last, ‘Towards a Political History of Youth in Muslim Northern Nigeria, 1750-
2000’ in Jon Abbink and Ineke van Kessel (eds.), Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics 
and Conflict in Africa, Leiden: Brill 2005, 37-54; Frank A. Salamone ‘Hausa Concepts of 
Masculinity and the “Yan Daudu”’ in Journal of Men, Masculinities and Spirituality 1:1 
(2007), 45-54.  
19  Salamone, ‘Hausa Concepts’. 
20  Modupe Labode, ‘From Heathen Kraal to Christian Home: Anglican Mission Education 
and African Christian Girls, 1850-1900’ in Fiona Bowie, Deborah Kirkwood and Shirley 
Ardener (eds.), Women and Missions: Past and Present, Providence: Berg 1993, 126-
144.  
21  The Pew Forum, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Washington, D.C.: The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2010, 20, accessed 1 August 
2012, http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Belief_and_Practices/sub-saharan-
africa-full-report.pdf. 
22  Butler, Gender Trouble.  
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eventually institutionalized, even if it never actually matched reality, 
especially in the south. Among the Yoruba, for instance, women have 
continued to play a significant role in productive activities.23 Nevertheless, 
new dimensions were added to local notions of personhood and today the 
male breadwinner norm is widely accepted in Nigeria to the point that it 
has become a dominant element within gender ideology. Even though in 
practice it may be impossible to realize and some women may in fact earn 
more than their husbands,24 this still puts a burden on men, who are 
expected to live up to it and are seen as failures if they do not.  
In fact, the majority of men have not found it easy to do this, since 
few have ever been able to acquire steady employment that paid a living 
wage.25 During the first few decades after independence, decent 
employment was becoming easier to find. However, in the mid-1980s, 
when the international financial institutions forced the state to carry out 
structural adjustment, this process went into reverse as jobs disappeared 
and even many skilled men found themselves relegated to low-paid 
unskilled or semi-skilled employment, or with little choice but to enter the 
informal labour market.26 This is the situation in much of Nigeria today and 
certainly in Kaduna.  
Therefore, the forces of globalizing capitalism that during colonial 
times helped produce the breadwinner norm have also been complicit in 
dismantling the structures that could have made it a reality. The result is 
the uneasy co-existence of a masculine cultural ideal lacking the material 
underpinnings that produced it, in a cultural setting in which the defining 
element of adult masculinity, the ability to exert effective control over 
wives and children, has also long depended on control over resources.27 
                                                     
23  Lisa A. Lindsay, ‘Working with Gender: The Emergence of the “Male Breadwinner” in 
Colonial Southwestern Nigeria’ in Catherine M. Cole, Takyiwaa Manuh, and Stephan F. 
Miescher (eds.), Africa After Gender? Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 2007, 
241-252. 
24  Andrea Cornwall, ‘To be a Man' is More than a Day's Work: Shifting Ideals of 
Masculinity in Ado-Ado, Southwestern Nigeria’ in Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan F. 
Miescher (eds.), Men and Masculinities in Modem Africa, Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann 
2003, 230-248. 
25  Lindsay, ‘Working with Gender’. See also Margrethe Silberschmidt, ‘Women Forget that 
Men are the Masters’: Gender Antagonism and Socio-Economic Change in Kisii District, 
Kenya, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 1999. 
26  Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008. 
27  See Margrethe Silberschmidt, ‘Disempowerment of Men in Urban and Rural East Africa: 
Implications for Male Identity and Sexual Behavior’ in World Development 29:4 (2001), 
657-671; Colette Harris, ‘Gender-age Systems and Social Change: A Haugaardian Power 
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The consequences have been very negative, as both individuals and the 
state struggle to come to terms with the situation, some doing so by 
espousing what Connell has termed ‘masculine fundamentalism’, that is, 
the ‘reaffirm[ation of] local gender hierarchies.’28  
Preserving the Gender Order  
Since 1999, when democracy was reinstated in Nigeria after a long period 
of military rule, both federal and state governments, unable or unwilling to 
deal with the high levels of corruption and other root causes of social and 
economic malaise, have used the ploy of redefining the issues along 
completely different lines to enable them to provide manageable 
solutions.29 Presumably, they hoped to reassure the population that in this 
way chaos could be kept at bay. They have done this largely by directing 
public attention towards the two institutions of public order that are the 
focus of this paper – religion and gender – in the apparent belief that this 
sleight of hand would remove from view the lack of infrastructure needed 
to facilitate economic development and the poor condition of public 
services that together have facilitated recurring episodes of violence.  
This tactic was first used in northern Nigeria when Muslim majority 
states, including Kaduna, established shari’a law within their penal codes. 
They were encouraged to do so by overwhelming Muslim approbation, 
even if in places with large Christian populations, such as Kaduna, this also 
caused major unrest, and even occasioned major riots, as will be explained 
below. What the people hoped to achieve by this was to restore their own 
ideas of moral order – they believed shari’a law would compel the elites to 
put a halt to corruption and reduce inequalities by reinstating the Islamic 
institution of zakat or charity. In reality, the new legal code has been 
applied almost solely against the underprivileged, especially against poor 
women who appear to have transgressed the gender order.30 
More recently, attempts have been made to regulate this order 
through legislation, with the federal government instituting procedures to 
banish gender deviance by ‘prohibition[s] [that] protect ... society from the 
usurpation of its right to moral health and cultural decency.’ The desire to 
do this was so strong that in 2008 a bill was introduced in the federal 
                                                                                                                                       
Analysis based on Research from Northern Uganda’ in Journal of Political Power, 5:3 
2012. 
28  Connell, Globalization, 83. 
29  Cf. Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson, ‘The Risk Society in an Age of Anxiety: Situating 
Fear of Crime’ in The British Journal of Sociology, 48:2 (1997), 255-266: 265. 
30  Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 2009, 231ff. 
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senate to criminalize ‘sexual intimidation’ and ‘nudity’, the latter defined as 
‘the exposure of any private part of [a woman’s] body’, including parts 
routinely exposed by traditional rural dress. Sexual intimidation refers to 
women using what is often their sole means of achieving advancement – 
that is, the provision of sexual favours to attain employment or promotion. 
There is no provision for punishing men who benefit from this practice nor 
for enforcing gender equality in workplace practices, suggesting that one 
aim was to reduce women’s ability to compete with men in this domain.31  
While the bill never became law, its presentation and the fact it 
went through at least two readings strongly suggest members of congress 
wished to hold women responsible for the loss of social order. The moral 
side of the agenda was emphasized by the way the ‘nudity’ bill intended to 
incorporate ‘religious bodies [to work alongside the government] in the 
reformation of the society for moral uprightness’, a step that received 
enthusiastic support from the more conservative of such institutions. The 
largest Pentecostal Church in Nigeria, the Redeemed Christian Church of 
God, was one of the movers of this bill and clearly expected to play a 
significant role in enforcing it.32 The bill represented a significant attempt 
to reduce women’s power position and thereby promote masculine 
superiority. 
Even more draconian measures were introduced in 2011 in the 
shape of an anti-homosexuality bill, which this time did pass into law with 
the enthusiastic approbation even of some mainstream churches and 
mosques. It includes the provision of up to 14 years imprisonment for 
anyone convicted of engaging in homosexual acts; anyone proved to have 
been aware of such relations without reporting them may also become 
liable for long-term imprisonment. In northern shari’a states, Muslim men 
found guilty of practising homosexuality can theoretically receive the death 
penalty.33 Here we have yet another attempt by the government to 
promote their notions of traditional Nigerian masculinity. 
Through casting the blame for their own failings and the country’s 
economic woes on inappropriate gender performances, governments at 
                                                     
31  Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, ‘Nudity and Morality: Legislating Women’s Bodies and Dress in 
Nigeria’ in Sylvia Tamale (ed.), African Sexualities: A Reader, Oxford: Pambazuka Press 
2011, 116-129: 118. 
32  Ibid., 118. 
33  Matthew Cortina, ‘Nigeria's Anti-Homosexual Laws Also Apply to Tourists, Says Gov't’ in 
The Christian Post, Africa (13 December, 2011), accessed 1 August 2012, 
http://www.christianpost.com/news/nigerias-anti-homosexual-laws-also-apply-to-
tourists-says-govt-64738/#Bo5a1jo21IfESfX6.99.  
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both state and federal level have been drawing public attention away from 
their own failings by identifying scapegoats, labelling them as deviants, and 
simultaneously establishing measures to keep them under control, thereby 
giving the impression of having restored some kind of order.34 These pieces 
of legislation not only promote the idea that preserving a repressive form 
of gender order is an important part of state policy but also that religious 
institutions as well as individuals have a duty to support the government in 
enforcing this. The weight the Nigerian state gives to it can be measured by 
their open defiance of the western world, after Britain, the United States, 
and other governments not only strongly opposed the 2011 anti-
homosexuality bill but also threatened to remove aid streams when the 
Nigerians refused to back down.35 
Religion, Masculinities, and Order in Nigeria 
Nigeria’s gender order has thus been institutionalized through both the 
state and religious establishments. In fact, as Eisenstadt suggests, the 
production and maintenance of order more generally is central to the 
whole notion of religion, that is to the ‘[construction of] a realm of the 
sacred, in which direct contact with the roots of cosmic or social order is 
established, and which serves as a focal point for the construction of 
symbolic and institutional boundaries inherent in the constitution of such 
order.’36 He goes on to say each religion has its own organisatory codes, 
which also serve to bind its members together. These are linked to local 
cultural ideals, among which is the appropriate performance of gender.37  
I hesitate to apply the term religion, filled as it is with Europeanized, 
Christian-based ideology, to traditional African rituals.38 Since these are 
concerned with appeasing the spirits and asking their support for human 
endeavours, however, they fulfil a similar function to religion in their 
                                                     
34  Using a similar approach to the one the British government adopted in relation to 
crime. See Hollway and Jefferson, ‘The Risk Society’. Or that the US government used in 
suggesting it was welfare paid to single mothers that was bankrupting the state 
(accessed 1 August 2012, http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/L-runawaywelfare.htm). 
35  Ola Awoniyi, ‘Nigeria Pushes Ahead with Anti-Gay Bill Despite US Moves’, Agence 
France Presse (7 December 2011), accessed 1 August 2012, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hGMOBMHXSWgpF2LnZ8P37
9ocgQAw?docId=CNG.031c6610f1165094d5d5eea3e35a3113.61. 
36  Eisenstadt, ‘The Construction of Collective Identities’, 34-36. 
37  Ibid., 39. 
38  See Bryan S. Turner, Religion and the Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularization and 
the State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2011. 
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concern with keeping chaos at bay.39 In fact, religious conversion has often 
been less about abandoning traditional rituals than adding powerful new 
spirits to existing ones,40 so it is not uncommon even today for churchgoers 
to continue their traditional rituals.41 Yoruba carry out Ogboni rites while 
Bori (spirit possession) cults are practised by Hausa Muslims in northern 
Nigeria.42 It is said that traditional rituals took on particular salience as a 
consequence of colonially produced instabilities. The latter have been 
significantly increased by structural adjustment, which may well go some 
way to account for the global growth in religiosity since the domination of 
the world by neoliberal ideology.  
The stresses of the last few decades have shown the inability of 
mainstream churches and older forms of Islam to provide the level of 
order, control and conviction many people are seeking to help hold back 
the demons of chaos. As a result, clerics from mainstream churches say 
they have fast been losing membership to reformist versions of Islam and 
charismatic Christianity and this has created considerable bad feeling 
between the two groups. Nevertheless, these newer establishments are 
becoming increasingly attractive, particularly to the young seeking support 
unavailable elsewhere,43 with the concomitant legitimization of the current 
gender order playing a crucial role in a further manifestation of Connell’s 
masculine fundamentalism.44 In other words, in these institutions, gender 
regimes that promote masculine superiority go hand in hand with a 
tendency towards literalist interpretations of the scriptures, together 
producing a level of assurance missing in most other aspects of 
contemporary life. 
This is accompanied by a tendency to treat other 
religions/denominations in a hostile manner aimed at producing strong 
collective identities, in part by each church or mosque drawing firm 
boundaries around themselves and their congregations, simultaneously 
                                                     
39  Okot p’Bitek, African Religions in Western Scholarship, Kampala: East African Literature 
Bureau 1970. 
40  Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar, Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political 
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scapegoating and excluding the ‘other’, whether members of a different 
religion or of different branches of the same religion. This has served to 
enhance the certitude of the righteousness of one’s own group,45 a process 
in which notions of appropriate gender performance occupy a central 
place. 
This is certainly the case in northern Nigeria, where a plethora of 
new religious institutions has now sprung up, particularly noticeable on the 
Christian side, but visible within Islam too. While intra-religious conflicts 
among both Muslims and Christians used to predominate, so that even 
today Sunni and Shi’a, Catholic and Protestant, form uneasy bedfellows, 
many of these new establishments have institutionalized interreligious 
hostility,46 thereby facilitating the sectarian violence that has become rife 
in northern Nigeria over the last few decades. 
A further trend is the totalizing of religious experiences in ways that 
close off all space for grass-roots activities or informal worship. The more 
conservative of the new denominations aspire to dominate all aspects of 
their congregations’ lives and explicitly find ways to substitute for the kinds 
of practical and emotional support earlier gained through extramural 
activities, such as traditional African rituals.47 This is the case both for 
reformist Muslim sects, such as Yan Izala, which is very popular in Kaduna 
and the aim of which is to purify Islam of local accretions,48 and the 
charismatic Pentecostal churches in which healings and exorcisms are 
regular occurrences.49 
Men’s Coping Strategies in Kaduna 
Background50 
Kaduna was built as an independent capital for northern Nigeria shortly 
before the north and south were joined to form one country in 1914. 
During the succeeding decades, missionaries and their schools proliferated 
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in the south but the British largely kept all such activity out of the north.51 
As a result, by independence in 1960 the south had vastly higher education 
levels and with them a considerably superior economy.52 To offset this, one 
condition of independence was that the north would be accorded political 
leadership, in this way institutionalizing the north-south, Muslim-Christian 
split.53 Today this divide has become highly politically salient, producing 
numerous episodes of sectarian violence,54 while the south has continued 
to be better educated and more developed.  
The Nigerian economy is now dominated by oil revenues. These 
were used by the post-independence developmental state to finance 
infrastructure, health services and schools. As oil prices rose in the 1970s, 
so did public spending, only to crash after 1982 when the world price of oil 
dropped dramatically, leaving the state unable to meet its financial 
commitments. In 1985 politicians succumbed to international pressures to 
implement World Bank and International Monetary Fund plans for a 
structural adjustment programme; this proved so disastrous the country 
has never recovered. Now exposed to the vagaries of global markets, the 
economic situation has been steadily worsening, producing high levels of 
unemployment,55 while political office holders gain access to oil revenues 
they are able to exploit for their personal benefit.  
Kaduna sits in the middle belt, its population evenly divided 
between Christians and Muslims. The latter are mainly of Hausa ethnicity 
while the former consist of members of local tribes together with southern 
migrants, mainly Igbo and Yoruba, although a considerable proportion of 
the latter is Muslim.56 With unemployment rates well above the Nigerian 
average – over 20 per cent of adult males and a much higher percentage of 
youths have no steady work57 – the population’s economic situation is 
problematic. The Hausa still suffer from a disparity in education levels with 
a very small percentage attaining post-secondary education and around 
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half having no more than primary education.58 This leaves them 
considerably disadvantaged in regard to employability compared with the 
far better educated Christians. 
Theoretically, they should be able to compensate for this through 
their social networks since the Hausa have long dominated political life in 
Kaduna. In practice, however, this works only for the minority with 
appropriate connections as well as at least some relevant qualifications or 
skills. Moreover, not only are their womenfolk very largely prohibited from 
taking up employment outside the home but, since Hausa men favour 
polygyny and often eschew birth control, they tend to have large families, 
making providing for them quite onerous.  
Over the last few decades, a number of episodes of sectarian 
violence have occurred. The worst in terms of numbers affected took place 
in February 2000 over disagreements relating to the proposition that 
shari’a law be incorporated into the criminal code of Kaduna State,59 the 
latest was sparked off by disputes over the 2011 presidential election. 
Religion and Masculinities60 
The increasing economic destabilization of the last few decades has left the 
majority of the population of Kaduna struggling not only to make ends 
meet but even to fulfil social obligations. In particular, men’s difficulties in 
achieving the male breadwinner norm have placed whole families in a 
problematic position so that people have been seeking help to cope with 
their difficult circumstances.  
Meanwhile, little support is provided by secular organizations. 
While there are NGOs in Kaduna, the participants in our project have 
received little help from them or indeed from the government. The retreat 
of the state and the dearth of effective civil-society institutions have placed 
religious institutions in an advantageous position. The men I worked with 
indicated they regarded religion as a valued aid in warding off chaos, in 
relation to both its spiritual side and the provision of practical support 
offered by churches and mosques. The latter, for instance, do their best to 
provide financial assistance for their poorest members to help them cope 
with their overall situation and where necessary to meet medical and 
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funeral expenses as well, even if only those mosques that receive help 
from international sources or that have a sizeable population of wealthy 
members, like the central mosque in Kaduna, are able to garner the means 
to do this effectively.61 
What has most strongly drawn people to religion and particularly to 
its newer forms – reformist Islam and charismatic Pentecostalism – has 
been the spiritual support they offer. The waves of sectarian violence 
experienced over the past few decades in Kaduna and the continued 
economic crisis have led to a loss of confidence in the old convictions. 
People have been experiencing a general sense of despair and a lack of 
belief in the future, accompanied by feelings of helplessness in the face of 
their inability to play an active role in controlling their fate or even to 
understand what is going on and why.  
It is here that the newer churches and mosques step in by bringing 
their members fresh certainties largely absent from the mainstream, in 
relation both to the causes of the current situation and ways of dealing 
with them. In particular, what is on offer here is structures of symbolic 
discourses in which Satan occupies a crucial place in the proliferation of 
obstacles to salvation. For one’s protection and ultimate redemption it is 
imperative to situate oneself on the side of God while determinedly 
renouncing all the doings of the devil. Exactly how this is to be 
accomplished depends on the religion and the institution concerned, each 
of which has its own path to salvation, facilitated through its particular 
notions of appropriate order and accompanying organisatory codes.  
Much of the theological message of the charismatic churches has 
thus to do with promoting the idea that what has gone wrong is the 
(attempted) takeover by satanic forces. This then suggests the problems 
we are living through today have been caused by elements on the 
supernatural plane, that is, by demons under the command of the devil. 
Muslims are also enjoined to abjure Satan, on the basis of Qur’anic verses 
that suggest him as the cause of poverty and the enemy of true Muslims.62 
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In both cases allegations of demonization are frequently made against the 
other religion.  
Vital for both religions is adherence to appropriate gender 
performances. These are among the most important of organisatory codes 
and especially emphasized by the newer churches and mosques that as a 
general tendency support certain conservative elements, particularly male 
superiority, while shifting others, for instance to allow women access to 
aspects of public life hitherto closed to them.  
For Muslims this means that, contrary to some notions of Hausa 
masculinity, men are expected to permit their womenfolk to attend school, 
especially the religious schools run by their own sects. Women are to be 
encouraged to study on the grounds that this is fundamental to the whole 
concept of Islam and the importance it places on learning and knowledge. 
However, this does not mean they should participate in public life equally 
with men. Having women in positions of political power is abhorrent to 
reformist Muslims, and indeed charismatic Christians do not promote 
women to the top power positions either. 
The newer churches and mosques place considerable emphasis on 
dress codes. The issue of appropriate self-presentation raised in the 
‘nudity’ bill is particularly significant for the more conservative of these 
establishments, which tend to espouse strict dress rules. For Christian 
women this entails wearing modest skirts and blouses, and eschewing 
trousers, jewellery, make-up and ornate hairdos. For the Muslims it has 
meant that over the last couple of decades,63 a cloak covering both head 
and body has become so much a mark of Hausa culture it is now worn by 
all in Kaduna but the most educated women and girls, irrespective of sect. 
Today, some have adopted an even more radical dress code whereby face, 
feet, and hands are also covered, leaving only the eyes exposed to view. 
For both religions, the wearing of such garments represents the display of 
appropriate femininity as symbolic submission to the will of God/Allah as 
well as to earthly masculine power. 
Men are supposed to dress appropriately too. For Muslims, this 
means wearing northern Nigerian robes and covering their heads with a 
cap or a turban. For Christians, it means dressing respectfully, such as in a 
suit and tie. However, each denomination has its own regulations and 
there have been clashes within the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria over 
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exactly what these should be. Similar clashes have taken place among 
Muslim sects.  
The charismatic churches and reformist mosques promote a 
rupture with the past that entails the rejection of former lifestyles and 
associated close ties, in some cases even including abandoning extended 
family relationships in favour of members taking the congregation of 
believers as their family. New gender practices are at the heart of the 
personal transformations required.  
Both sets of establishments have proposed their own approaches to 
marriage. The main changes are in respect of polygyny and the payment of 
bridewealth. Efforts to eliminate these were at the centre of the attempts 
of early missionaries to re-engineer African gender norms, but they proved 
too deeply engrained in local cultures.64 Some African churches have even 
legitimized polygyny. The newer Pentecostals, however, insist on removing 
all such accretions in much the same way as does Yan Izala. 
As a result, attempts have been made to stop or limit the payments 
that usually accompany weddings in Kaduna. These include not only 
bridewealth but multiple other sums paid to officiating clergy, to local 
officials and to various members of the bride’s family. Removing these 
makes it easier for young men to afford to marry, an essential step in the 
attainment of adult masculinity and already difficult enough to achieve 
without additional payments, considering the need to provide an 
independent home and meet the concomitant expenses. This thus 
facilitates both their transition to adult manhood and their fathers’ 
appropriate performance of masculinity (see below). 
The charismatic Pentecostal churches are adamant no member of 
their congregation should practise polygyny. For obvious reasons this is not 
so clear-cut in respect of reformist Islamic sects, although there is a 
tendency there too towards the practice, if not the ideology, of monogamy. 
For some people there is a question mark over whether the Qur’an really 
legitimizes polygyny at will or whether this was rather intended to be a 
means of providing support to widows and orphans after a major disaster 
such as war. Moreover, the Qur’anic exhortation to treat all wives equally 
is considered impossible to comply with, so the suggestion is that the 
intention was to make monogamy the preferred mode of marriage in 
Islam.65 In Kaduna it is more local tradition, therefore, than religious 
sanction that has encouraged polygyny.  
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The Muslims regarded this issue with ambivalence. On the one 
hand, it enhanced masculine status, on the other it demanded significant 
resources. Older men among the poorer inhabitants of Kaduna seemed to 
have favoured it and indeed some justified this by claiming it was 
mandated by their religion. However, the youths in our education project 
considered it made no sense for them to practise it and believed it would 
be unfeasible for most men in their generation to do so. 
As suggested above, men see the difficulty of living up to 
expectations as breadwinner as the single most problematic aspect of 
contemporary masculinity in Kaduna, as also perhaps in Africa as a whole. 
It is experienced as a serious threat to their dispositional power position – 
that is, the power that adheres to them through their positioning as adult 
men.66 In southern Nigeria, many men who have been unable to maintain 
this role themselves have had to see their wives take over as primary 
earners.67 This occurs much less in northern Nigeria owing to the Hausa 
practice of female seclusion, which to a certain extent has influenced 
Christian behaviour there too. While Christian women are not actually 
secluded and in Kaduna many of them go out to work, quite a few 
complained they were kept under stricter control than is usual among 
southerners, their husbands copying their Muslim neighbours in this 
respect. However, this not only puts greater pressure on men but is highly 
problematic for those unable to provide adequately. The inability of men of 
both religions to meet their wives’ demands, suggests that even if the 
women do not earn more than their husbands like those Cornwall studied 
in the south west, this has still affected their level of respect for the men. 
Women have told me they often act aggressively towards husbands who 
fail to meet their expectations, to the point of provoking arguments that at 
times end up in violence. 
The women appeared to feel that if they carried out their own 
child-rearing and domestic responsibilities appropriately, their husbands 
should fulfil their part of the ‘patriarchal bargain’.68 In a meeting of a men’s 
group from one of the local churches, it was suggested that the women’s 
expectations in effect demanded their husbands perform like ‘heroes’, so 
difficult were the men finding it to earn sufficient to give their families a 
decent standard of living.  
Men’s relationships with their sons were similarly fraught with 
problems resulting from economic hardships. Through their inability to 
                                                     
66  Colette Harris, ‘Gender-age Systems’; Silberschmidt, Women Forget. 
67  Andrea Cornwall, ‘To be a Man'. 
68  Salamone, ‘Concepts of Masculinity’, 51. 
Harris: Masculinities and Religion in Kaduna, Nigeria 
226                                               Religion and Gender vol. 2, no. 2 (2012), pp. 207-230 
provide school fees or help their sons enter tertiary education, many men 
felt they were losing their offspring’s respect, and this was confirmed when 
the young men showed resentment of their fathers’ demands on them. 
These would be, for instance, to help with farming or other time-
consuming tasks, with neither financial remuneration nor even in many 
cases what the youths regarded as suitable gratitude. 
The hurt expressed by the older men at their sons’ negative 
attitudes reflected among other things the loss of masculinity the inability 
to command their sons’ unquestioning obedience represented. This was 
exacerbated by their feelings of failure when unable to live up to 
expectations of fatherhood by providing properly for their offspring. A 
particularly important element of mature manhood here is the ability to 
support a son to marry and establish his own household, since passage to 
full adulthood is symbolized by marriage and procreation. The men’s 
incapacity to provide this represented a double failure – both to live up to 
the ideals of masculinity for their age group, and to support their sons to 
live up to theirs.  
This lack of the respect from other family members that adult men 
have long seen as their entitlement seriously threatens the gender order. 
Men’s ability to exert their authority over wives and children is crucial 
here. The fact that in the past this had a material basis in adult men’s 
control over resources is both (tacitly) acknowledged and simultaneously 
experienced as problematic now they are losing their grip on it. Even so, 
they still feel their dispositional power position entitles them to receive the 
same level of respect as before. The same phenomenon has been noted 
elsewhere in Africa, in northern Uganda69 and western Kenya,70 for 
instance.71 The problem is how to preserve this today when the material 
circumstances no longer warrant it. Here religion comes to the rescue, at 
least in part.  
In Kaduna, the newer churches and mosques are particularly 
insistent on preserving male control over women. The latter have more of 
a role to play within the newer churches and mosques than in the 
mainstream ones but they are also expected to acknowledge their position 
as submissive and subordinate partners to their husbands. Such religious 
affiliation can therefore protect men from challenges to their power 
position, at least on the part of their wives.  
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The situation with sons is less clear. The newer establishments tend 
to support young men’s desire for independence from their fathers, 
particularly if this entails the youths’ deciding to become members in 
defiance of parental disapproval. Such a move allows them to free 
themselves from the burden of filial obligations. It is less apparent how this 
works in families where fathers and sons are members of the same 
charismatic church or reformist mosque. 
The elements of masculinity dealt with so far have primarily been 
concerned with men’s relationships with wives and children. Their 
relationships with one another in public spaces call upon different aspects 
of gender performance. Here the certainties emanating from the newer 
religious institutions, especially the demonization of the other religion, play 
a significant role. Sermons from both sides call for jihad on the part of their 
congregation against the forces of Satan, often implicitly or at times even 
explicitly naming the other religion as the source of evil. Ruth Marshall 
quotes a Pentecostal pastor who makes a call to join in what might be 
classed as a Christian jihad – ‘a battle’ in which the weapons were to be 
‘militant, strategic and aggressive prayer’ since it was ‘a war’ against 
‘invisible powers in high places’.72 The aim here is in part theological and in 
part a struggle against those powers that might prevent Pentecostals from 
capturing the Nigerian state and, along with this, preparing for salvation 
during the immanent second coming. In all of these, Islam is characterized 
as an important and demonic enemy, an obstacle preventing the triumphal 
victory of this brand of Christianity. 
Both millenarian churches and mosques hold religious warfare to be 
sacred and their clergy are not always as sure as the pastor quoted above 
that this should remain at the level of prayer. The result can be seen in the 
multiple episodes of sectarian violence that have occurred in northern 
Nigeria over the last few decades, producing tens of thousands of deaths.73 
Calls to participate in the violence have come from religious as well as 
secular leaders. It is noticeable that these have frequently occurred within 
sermons preached by clergy from both religions and in some places 
religious leaders have even been accused of taking leading roles in attacks 
on members of the other faith.74 
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This has meant that religious masculinity has in part come to be 
defined through men’s willingness to support their own, if necessary 
through violence. This at least was how the young men I worked with in 
Kaduna experienced it. They felt they were expected to concur with the 
idea that a ‘real man’ is one who supports his religion, if necessary by 
laying down his life for it. While, they said, each religion supported its own 
norms of masculinity, such institutions as the ability to impose seclusion on 
their womenfolk differentiating Hausa Muslim men from their Christian 
counterparts, in regard to violence and sectarian conflict there was great 
similarity between the performances expected of adherents of the two 
religions. 
The performance of violence has even come to be constitutive of a 
certain kind of brotherhood, especially for those young men with few other 
ways of living up to local notions of masculinity. The major episodes in 
which large numbers of killings take place are the most vicious but they 
represent only a fraction of the multiple incidences of violence that have 
been occurring in Kaduna on a daily basis, aligning groups of youths from 
each religion against each other usually over trivial issues such as minor 
traffic accidents.  
Thus, all too often in recent years, the togetherness of men in 
relation to church or mosque has occurred in responding to calls to 
violence. Churches have men’s groups that meet regularly to discuss issues 
that concern them and this may well include family-related problems, and 
especially men’s overwhelming preoccupation with earning a living, as I 
have indicated above. However, especially since the shari’a riots of 2000, 
the issue of violence all too often dominates people’s thinking, especially 
recently, since fears of the ‘other’ have been reinforced both by the post-
election clashes of April 2011 and by the escalating attacks on Christians on 
the part of the Islamic grouping known as Boko Haram.  
Of course, men face many of the same quandaries in other parts of 
Africa too, as indeed in much of the rest of the world, since few places 
today are free of the destabilizing influence of the global political economy. 
The consequence has very often been intensified competition over 
resources, resulting in attempts to police the boundaries of moral 
communities in ways that facilitate exclusion and violence, similarly to 
what has been occurring in northern Nigeria.75 However, this region is 
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unique in Sub-Saharan Africa in certain aspects of its social relationships, 
first in its promotion of female seclusion and the wider influences this 
exerts on local society, but also in the politicization of religion and the way 
sectarian violence has come to dominate interpersonal relationships and 
everyday practices. Therefore, while as in other parts of Nigeria76 and 
elsewhere too,77 men in Kaduna spend the majority of their time trying to 
live up to their provider roles, many of their most serious concerns, in as 
well as out of the religious context, revolve around sectarian problems, 
especially the likelihood of a new outbreak, and the ways they will be 
called upon to respond. 
Conclusion 
Neither of the two dominant issues in Kaduna today – sectarian violence 
and unemployment – can be separated from religion. This is particularly 
true for male members of reformist Islamic sects and charismatic 
Pentecostal churches for whom besides material support, their creed has 
provided new ways of being in the world that have allowed them to cope 
spiritually with the precarious situations in which they find themselves. In 
part this has been attained through the moral support that has enabled 
them to maintain control over their families, despite their material 
problems. 
Meanwhile, it is a paradox of today’s situation that while the 
instability that plagues the population has partly been produced by 
sectarian violence, the newer religious institutions have tended to intensify 
the divisions between them, thereby effectively increasing the probability 
of further episodes of violence and so producing a vicious spiral. 
These problems were facilitated by the way colonialism was 
implemented in Nigeria, along with the introduction of the two major 
religions that produced much of the gender power imbalance noted above. 
The combination legitimized breadwinning as a significant element within 
masculine normativity, while already during colonial times but even more 
because of the way post-colonial Nigeria has been embedded in the global 
political economy since then, the majority of its male inhabitants, and 
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especially those in the north, have effectively been prevented from being 
able to live up to this norm. The continuing economic crises make it 
unlikely that in the near future this will change for the better, especially 
since the neoliberal ideology imposed by the international financial 
institutions has rolled back the state and thus prevented its coming to the 
aid of the populace.  
In effect, for large swathes of the population all options other than 
religion that might have provided either moral or material support have 
been eliminated, and this has facilitated the growth of the newer 
establishments as well as their competition over the state and the 
concomitant sectarian violence. On the positive side, this is also linked to 
notions of masculine brotherhood within church and mosque, albeit often 
played out in conflict situations. In this way, religion and masculinities have 
come together in men’s struggles to survive in the complex situation of 
Kaduna today. 
